Motions in Motion
In recent years, I began unveiling all sorts of violations - on civil and constitutional levels. I then educated myself on drafting motions with the court (unable to afford counsel or other representation - turned down and not even acknowledged when seeking counsel for representation). My first motion indicated fraud on many levels, but the magistrate on the case attempted to apply a law which only pertains to CONTESTING paternity, whereby my claim was fraud which has no statute of limitation. Magistrates do NOT have approval from any legislative member, group or entity to amend laws which do not exist or apply laws to a claim which do not exist - yet, this is what the magistrate's have done.
This past January (2018), I filed the following motion:
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL FOR APPELLATE COURT'S DECISION TO DENY MOTION TO OPEN JUDGMENT
Judge Carbonneau, Family Court Magistrate [New Britain, CT] indicated in family court that a "Defendant by his signature declared that he freely and voluntarily signed the acknowledgment" which became the factor in denial of defendant's motion. No such declaration was ever made by the Defendant as the defendant has made multiple declarations in ALL prior motions and in ALL prior hearings that the signature the State of Connecticut obtained was coerced. For Judge Carbonneau to falsify this fact questions the court's conduct/ethics and judiciary responsibilities to declare factual statements made by the Defendant and/or Plaintiff regardless of whether to court agrees to the statements or not and is construed as perjury.
Judge Carbonneau also declared that "On October 25, 1990 the defendant repeated this same acknowledgment process with the same forms for a boy born in 1990". What Judge Carbonneau willfully refuses is to verify that there is no child support order for the alleged second child [no changes in arrears or support] and, as with the first child, there is no waiver of right to a blood test which is required by laws mandated by our legislature; an attested waiver of the right to a blood test and no such document exists that pertains to any declaration of such waiver for either child1. A court appointed attorney was never assigned to Defendant for this alleged second child [boy] and no public defender was assigned per Defendant's rights; as previously stated in prior motions, no support order was issued or ordered by the court.
To support the prior statement, On April 4, 2017, Defendant reported a missing document from Dkt# 880432921 to the state attorney's office which had the alleged 2nd child [boy] with his name crossed off and a reference on the bottom of the document that Defendant could not be found to be served. This document was not copied from the Defendant because it was entrusted to the Superior Court clerk's office and existed within the docket which the Defendant observed at a previous time/visit and was going to be disputed. This action declares document tampering by an existing party to also include all magistrates who presided on the above case. The states attorney's office never launched an investigation into the matter.
Furthermore, it was also declared that "On December 2, 2016 Magistrate Dee held a brief hearing to consider defendant's motion. The Magistrate, relying solely on the three-year statute of limitation in C.G.S. Section 46-b172 in effect at the same time of the acknowledgments, denied the motion". Contrary to Judge Dee's decision, Judge Dee's decision was not based upon state laws that declare that "an acknowledgment cannot be challenged except in court upon showing of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact"2 which does not declare any time period for such challenging. The three-year rule does not, nor has ever been applied to challenging an acknowledgment showing fraud, duress or [Sec. 46b-172. (Formerly Sec. 52-442a); subsection (A) 2 Sec 46b-172] material mistake of fact. Coercing a signature is considered fraud and is illegal in the highest order when also combined with no waiver of right to a blood test – an order so high in regard that a superior court judge ruled in favor of allowing the challenge to move forward.3
Judge Dee's ruling is considered unlawful as no governor appointed attorney who acts as magistrate is permitted to create or amend existing laws – Judge Dee applied a three-year rule to his ruling which does not exist because there is no expiration or time limitation on contesting an acknowledgment where fraud, duress or material mistake of fact is eminent and ruled illegally. Judge Carbonneau supported Judge Dee's unlawful ruling which could predicate conspiracy and compromised ethics and conduct.
Judge Carbonneau's statement also declared "…because an unknown and unnamed Support Enforcement Officer or Officers threatened him with incarceration". For a magistrate to demand a name from the Defendant in regards to threats of incarceration for the purpose of signing an acknowledgment, which spans back over 25 years is not only considered preposterous, but also unreasonable. Yet, Judge Carbonneau declared that "Evidence and witnesses from 25 years ago is understandably lost" – a witness for which the court demanded from the Defendant who coerced him into signing the acknowledgment – contradictory, hypocritical and unreasonable. The conduct and ethics behind the actions of Judge Carbonneau is unacceptable and demands reprimand and disciplinary action. Judge Carbonneau, who is expected to be a fair and impartial jurist, was not fair and impartial and considered unreasonable for his request.
Furthermore, Judge Carbonneau continued to state "…He did not deny that the documents were signed before a Notary Public who sealed them as defendant's free act and deed". This statement, as contradictory as it is, is untrue in its entirety as Defendant has no control to what a Notary's actions are after signing an acknowledgment which was coerced by the State of Connecticut and cannot be considered a "free act and deed" by the Defendant. If this statement bared any truth, the Defendant would not be requesting a motion to open judgment for fair trial and challenging fraud.
CHAPTER 815y - Sec. 46b-172. Acknowledgment of paternity and agreement to support; judgment. Review of acknowledgment of paternity. (a)(1) In lieu of or in conclusion of proceedings under Section 46b-160, a written acknowledgment of paternity executed and sworn to by the putative father of the child when accompanied by (A) an attested waiver of the right to a blood test, the right to a trial and the right to an attorney, and (B) a written affirmation of paternity executed and sworn to by the mother of the child shall have the same force and effect as a judgment of the Superior Court.
Connecticut state law (mandated by legislature) grants every defendant a right to trial where accusation of paternity is present. The State of Connecticut Child Support Enforcement Bureau in conjunction with multiple family court magistrates having illegally denied this right to trial. An accused defendant has not only civil rights, but also constitutional rights to a trial for which the above aforementioned have been denied to defendant.
Furthermore, a waiver of right to a blood test is also required by state law4 whereby The State of Connecticut Child Support Enforcement Bureau in conjunction with multiple family court magistrates have not produced to support the court's illegal rulings.
Establishing paternity means legally determining the biological father of a child. The signing of an Acknowledgement of Paternity does not establish such paternity and through the coercion of signing such document from the State of Connecticut Child Support Enforcement through means of threatening and intimidation is not only illegal, but does not validate any document to make the declaration of paternity as all Acknowledge of Paternities must be [signature] acquired voluntarily.
To further support the preceding statements, no DNA testing was ever conducted to validate said paternity and the signature obtained on the alleged Acknowledgement of Paternity was coerced. Coercion of any type conducted by any party who represents the State of Connecticut or the Family Court Magistrates who are required to cite law in findings [rulings] is illegal in all regards whereby a Super Court judge previously granted the right to a trial on another matter whereby ANY possibility of a coerced signature demands trial(5)
1: [Sec. 46b-172. (Formerly Sec. 52-442a); subsection (A)
2: Sec 46b-172
3: Delgado v. Martinez, No. FA 78-0434989S (July 3, 1990) – the court stated: "it would be fundamentally unfair for the law to imply a waiver of procedural due process rights merely because a person has signed an uncounseled and possibly coerced written acknowledgment of paternity" – Donald T. Dorsey Judge, Superior Court
4: The Fourteenth Amendment; No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Judge Carbonneau undoubtedly committed perjury to dismiss Defendant's motion. As a governor appointed attorney who acts as a magistrate in a Connecticut Judicial Branch, said magistrate is required to uphold judiciary ethics and law. The privileges that these judges have been granted have been abused and such privileges should be revoked immediately. Judge Carbonneau and Judge Dee failed to live up to those expectations as fair and impartial jurists and blatantly and willfully committed perjury in conjunction with amending laws without approval from state legislature for the sole purpose of denying Defendant's right to a trial for which Defendant has been denied since inception. Judge Dee ruled against Defendant applying a three-year rule which does not exist in any Connecticut state legislative law for the purpose of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact and is considered unlawful to do so – magistrates are not permitted by any governing official to amend laws or create them for the purpose of motion denial. Every defendant has the right to a trial as expressed and stated in civil and constitutional laws.
Judge Carbonneau committed perjury in his ruling announcing multiple false statements which can be contradicted by accessing transcripts and ANY prior motion(s) filed by the Defendant. A magistrate's ethics are not upheld when a Defendant has made the same declarations in multiple hearings and motions and said magistrate declares otherwise. This practice demands disciplinary action as perjury has been committed by Judge Carbonneau and unlawful applications applied by Judge Dee's ruling as no judge or magistrate can amend laws or create them for motion denial. Defendant would even consider imposing sanctions upon the above aforementioned magistrates for their ill-willed and illegal actions.
The fact that an investigation was never launched into the missing public document from the docket regarding the alleged second child would suggest a conspiracy to rid evidence for which the Defendant would have provided on his behalf for defense – to further support this would be the fact that no support order was ever established for the alleged second child and could never be proven because there are no existing documents that pertain to a change in arrears or support for a support order never entered.
In Roberts v. Greaves, supra at 5, Judge Covello stated: "implicit in every determination of support is the necessary finding that the defendant is the part of the child in question. Therefore, jurisdiction to determine paternity is implicit whenever there is jurisdiction to determine support" (1989) Delgado v. Martinez, 25 Conn. App. 155, 159, 593 A.2d 518 (1991). "Accordingly, we hold that the statute of limitations enunciated in General Statutes 46b-172 (a) is not enforceable against a party who has not validly waived his procedural due process rights and where a judgment of paternity has been entered without notice and an opportunity to be heard."
P.A. 91-391 amended Subsec.(a) by adding requirement that acknowledgment of paternity be accompanied by attested waiver of right to blood test, right to trial and right to an attorney and amended Subsec. (b) Effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 93-329 added Subsec. (c) re refund to petitioner of money paid by the petitioner to the state during period child supported by state where acknowledgment of paternity is reviewed and court finds petitioner is not father of the child.
Annotations to former section 52-435a: - 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 179. Former statute cited. Id., 581, 582. Defendant's paternity of plaintiff's child must be proved by plaintiff by a fair preponderance of evidence, as in any other civil case; evidence of substantive facts is essential and they cannot be proved by corroborative evidence consisting only of constancy of accusation.